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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a family of protocols for growing a private encryption key
between two parties. Despite much progress, all ground-based QKD approaches have a distance
limit due to atmospheric losses or in-fibre attenuation. These limitations make purely ground-
based systems impractical for a global distribution network. However, the range of communication
may be extended by employing satellites equipped with high-quality optical links. This manuscript
summarizes research and development which is beginning to enable QKD with satellites. It includes
a discussion of protocols, infrastructure, and the technical challenges involved with implementing
such systems, as well as a top level summary of on-going satellite QKD initiatives around the world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a relatively new
cryptographic primitive for establishing a private encryp-
tion key between two parties. The concept has rapidly
matured into a commercial technology since the first pro-
posal emerged in 1984 [1], largely because of a very at-
tractive proposition: the security of QKD is not based
on the computational hardness of solving mathematical
problems, but on physical processes that are not vulnera-
ble to powerful computers. As an example, in public-key
encryption, the public keys and message transcripts can
be stored and subjected to cryptanalysis at any time, and
while they might be secure now, they might not be secure
against newer, more powerful computers at some point in
the future. In contrast, if the key generated from a QKD
protocol is secure today, it will remain secure against
advances in computing power. This property, known as
‘forward security’, makes it an ideal solution to ensure
the secrecy of sensitive data that must be kept confiden-
tial for long periods of time. Furthermore, as QKD is
primarily an optical technology, it has the ability to au-
tomate the delivery of encryption keys between any two
points that share an optical link, which is advantageous
given the growth of optical communication networks. In
particular, QKD has the potential to replace or augment
existing trusted-courier systems for secure transmission
of encryption keys.
There are a variety of optical techniques for imple-
menting QKD. The most common class of solutions en-
code each bit of private information onto discrete degrees
of freedom of optical signals, and hence is termed col-
lectively as discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD). An alter-
native approach employs coherent communication tech-
niques to encode the private information, and is known as
continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD). Both approaches
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have seen dedicated engineering that has led to increased
key generation rates and improved compatibility with
current communications infrastructure [2–4]. However,
both approaches face a similar obstacle when attempting
to implement wide-scale deployment of QKD: physical
communication channels introduce transmission losses
that increase exponentially with distance, greatly lim-
iting the secure key rates that can be achieved over long
ranges.
For any pure-loss channel with transmittance η, it has
been shown that the secure key rate per mode of any
QKD protocol scales linearly with η for small η [5, 6].
This places a fundamental limit to the maximum distance
attainable by QKD protocols relying on direct transmis-
sion. To put this into perspective, consider that a con-
ventional telecommunications fibre with an attenuation
of 0.18 dB/km [7] stretching over 1000 km has a theo-
retical transmittance of precisely η = 10−18 – worse in
real-world deployments – making the resulting key rates
forbiddingly small. The problem remains even if using
state-of-the-art fibres which can reach attenuations of
0.142 dB/km [8]. Experiments have been reported where
QKD was performed for distances of up to 404 km [9],
but the resulting key rates remain several orders of mag-
nitude smaller than the requirements for practicable de-
ployment. Sufficiently large key rates can only be ob-
tained over metropolitan-scale networks where the range
is within 100 km.
In principle, it is possible to extend the range of QKD
by using quantum repeaters. Some proposals for quan-
tum repeaters rely on heralded entanglement generation
and purification [10, 11], while other recent architec-
tures employ logical qubits capable of quantum error-
correction to overcome both operational errors [12, 13]
and errors due to loss [14, 15]. The difficulty of con-
structing such systems, however, is comparable to the
challenges faced in building universal quantum comput-
ers, with the required technology unlikely to be available
in the near future.
An alternative, which is viable with the present
level of technology, is to use satellites as intermediate
trusted nodes for communication between locations on
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the ground. By placing a satellite above the Earth’s at-
mosphere, direct links can be established between ground
stations and the satellite, thus enabling communication
between distant points on the planet. Atmospheric at-
tenuation in free space is less significant than in fibre,
where for instance values of 0.07 dB/km can be achieved
at 2400 m above sea-level [16], with higher attenuations
at lower altitudes and negligible attenuation in the vac-
uum above the Earth’s atmosphere. Dominant sources
of loss in this case occur due to beam diffraction and
the limited size of telescopes at the receiver. However,
the overall effect is a greatly reduced amount of loss
compared to ground-level transmission, making satellite
QKD a promising route to enable secure key generation
across global distances. Consequently, a number of ef-
forts are under way to raise the technology readiness level
of satellite QKD. These projects range from truck-based
tests of pointing and tracking mechanisms [17], to in-
orbit testing of quantum light sources [18], to full QKD
demonstrations using orbiting satellites [19]. Together,
these efforts will enable global QKD services as well as
advanced fundamental experiments [20].
In this review, we give an overview of the advances,
challenges, and future directions of satellite-based QKD.
We begin by discussing the basic concepts for performing
QKD with satellites, regarding both protocols and infras-
tructure. We continue by discussing the technical chal-
lenges and progress towards realization in more detail.
We conclude by giving a summary of existing quantum
satellite initiatives around the world.
II. QKD PROTOCOLS
In this section, we give a brief overview of QKD as well
as the most commonly deployed protocols, which can be
skipped by experts in the field. An in-depth review of
QKD can be found in Ref. [21] while a discussion of the
frontiers of research in practical QKD appears in Ref.
[22].
QKD is a scheme for enabling two parties, commonly
referred to as Alice and Bob, to derive a private and sym-
metric encryption key. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, QKD protocols can be divided into two main classes:
DV-QKD or CV-QKD. In CV-QKD, information is en-
coded in the quadratures of randomly selected coherent
states, which are then measured using either homodyne
or heterodyne detection [23, 24]. From an implementa-
tion perspective, the optical tools are already very ma-
ture and widely used in conventional coherent communi-
cation schemes. However, significant challenges remain,
such as in the need to decrease the classical communica-
tion between the two parties when establishing the final,
secret key [22, 24, 25]. Most satellite QKD projects have
chosen to implement discrete-variable schemes, and this
paper will concentrate on DV-QKD concepts and techni-
cal solutions.
DV-QKD systems can be subdivided into prepare-and-
measure or entanglement-based protocols. In a generic
prepare-and-measure protocol [1, 26, 27], Alice encodes
each classical bit into an individual optical signal before
transmitting it to Bob, who performs a prescribed set of
measurements on each of the incoming signals in order
to retrieve the classical data encoded in their states.
In the BB84 protocol [1], which is the most widely de-
ployed prepare-and-measure protocol, each classical bit
is encoded into the polarization of an individual photon.
Alice prepares the photon states by randomly choosing
between the horizontal/vertical Z basis {|H〉, |V 〉} and
the +45◦/-45◦ X basis { 1√
2
(|H〉+ |V 〉), 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉)},
where |H〉, |V 〉 are single-photon states of horizontal and
vertical polarization. The states in each basis are as-
signed bit values of 0 and 1 respectively, from which the
encryption key can be established.
Once Alice has selected the basis, she randomly se-
lects one of the two states and sends it to Bob. Upon
receiving a signal from Alice, Bob randomly selects one
of the two bases and performs a corresponding projec-
tive measurement, recording his outcome as a classical
bit. After many signals have been sent, Alice and Bob
publicly announce the basis they have chosen for each
signal and they discard all cases when they chose a dif-
ferent basis. Finally, they select a random subset of their
data to estimate their relative errors. If the error rate is
sufficiently low, they apply error-correction and privacy
amplification to their data to reach a final shared secret
key. An important consideration is that the transmitter,
Alice, must have access to an active source of good ran-
dom numbers in order to make both the basis choice and
state choice. The recipient, Bob, needs also to be able to
make a random choice on the measurement set, but this
can be done passively, using beamsplitters [28].
Due to a lack of robust, true single-photon sources,
Alice’s states are usually weak coherent states produced
from laser sources, where each pulse has a finite probabil-
ity of containing more than a single photon. To be more
resilient against photon-number splitting attacks, an im-
portant innovation has been the creation of ‘decoy-states’
[29, 30], where Alice also chooses randomly between two
intensities of her coherent state signals, which she re-
veals publicly to Bob after the quantum communication
has been completed. The use of an additional degree-of-
freedom, such as the intensity leads to improved toler-
ance to losses compared to regular BB84. Notably, these
protocols can be currently deployed with commercial off-
the-shelf components.
Entanglement-based protocols [31, 32] differ from
prepare-and-measure systems by removing the need for
an active choice when encoding states into the photons.
Instead, both parties are recipients who share a source of
maximally-entangled photon pairs. Typical implemen-
tations utilize photon pairs entangled in the polariza-
tion degree of freedom, and the photon pair is split such
that one photon is transmitted to Alice, while its twin
is transmitted to Bob. Both parties make independent
measurement choices on the photons, and decide to mea-
2
sure them in either the X or Z basis. In the most popu-
lar entanglement-based protocol known as BBM92 [31],
Alice and Bob perform parameter estimation, error cor-
rection, and privacy amplification in the same manner as
in the BB84 protocol. This protocol has the advantage
that no active random number generators are required for
preparing the source, and that the measurement devices
for Alice and Bob are identical.
In an alternative entanglement-based approach, the
E91 protocol [32], the measurement scheme must re-
sult in a statement on whether the photon-pair corre-
lations between Alice and Bob violate the Bell inequal-
ity. This protocol is the precursor of device-independent
QKD schemes proposed much more recently [33]. From
a practical perspective, the measurement scheme in E91
is less efficient in its use of photon pairs as the Bell in-
equality test requires more polarization settings to be
monitored [34].
(c)
(b)(a)
FIG. 1. Illustration of the most common satellite QKD
scheme: the flying trusted-node. In step (a), the satellite
establishes a shared secret key KA with station A by running
a QKD protocol, which requires both classical and quantum
communication. This step is repeated in (b) to establish a
shared secret key KB , this time with station B located fur-
ther away. At the end of these steps, the satellite holds both
keys, while each station knows only their own. Finally, in step
(c), the satellite publicly announces the parity of both keys
KA⊕KB . This allows station B to determine key KA, which
can then be used to encrypt private communications to A and
vice versa.
III. CONCEPTS FOR SATELLITE QKD
In this section, we provide a high-level description
of some different conceivable approaches for performing
satellite QKD, which can be classified depending on the
types of communication links that can be established, as
well as the orbit of the satellite.
From a general perspective, most projects envision the
satellite as a flying trusted-node (see Fig 1). In this
scenario, the satellite carries out QKD operations with
distinct ground stations to establish independent secret
keys with each of them. The satellite holds all keys, while
the stations only have access to their own keys. To en-
able any pair of stations – for example station A and
station B – to share a common key, the satellite com-
bines their respective keys KA and KB and broadcasts
their bit-wise parity KA ⊕ KB . Using this announce-
ment, the stations can retrieve each other’s keys because
KA ⊕ (KA ⊕ KB) = KB and KB ⊕ (KA ⊕ KB) = KA.
Since the original keys are independent secret strings,
their bit-wise parity is just a uniformly random string,
so the parity announcement does not reveal any useful
information to potential eavesdroppers. However, since
the satellite holds all keys, access to the data obtained by
the satellite would give an adversary complete knowledge
of the key. Therefore, in this setting, the satellite must
be trusted.
Trusted-node topologies are being built for fibre net-
works [35], but ground-based nodes are fixed locations
that can be subject to constant surveillance and probes.
Side-channel attacks on QKD hardware that require ac-
cess to the optical link [36] can face significant challenges
in satellite scenarios where the optical link is moving rel-
atively quickly. Most side-channel attacks are aimed at
retrieving the key, and are distinct from denial-of-service
attacks where the goal is to disable the satellite receiver,
e.g. by aiming a sufficiently intense beam at the satellite
optical transceiver. Denial-of-service attacks may be less
of an issue if the satellite is only a transmitter. Addi-
tional research is needed however, to better understand
potential vulnerabilities in satellite QKD.
Quantum communication links with a satellite can be
classified either as uplinks – where the ground station
sends signals to a receiver in space – or downlinks, where
the satellite sends the signals to the ground. Correspond-
ingly, there are several possible configurations for per-
forming QKD with satellites depending on the types of
links that are used [20, 37–40]. These are illustrated in
Fig. 2.
There are advantages and disadvantages associated
with each configuration, but the more commonly recom-
mended scenario for operational QKD – and the only one
that has thus far been demonstrated [41] – is to use down-
links. This is because downlinks always have lower losses
for any ground-satellite segment. This arises because at-
mospheric properties such as turbulence cause the opti-
cal beam to wander, which translates into a less accurate
ground transmitter compared to a space-based transmit-
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FIG. 2. Illustration of different platforms for performing satellite QKD. Scenarios (1) and (2) depict a downlink and an
uplink, respectively, while in scenario (3) a downlink is simulated by using a retro-reflector on board the satellite. In (4) pairs
of entangled photons are being transmitted to Earth so that two ground stations can share entangled states. Finally, scenario
(5) illustrates how inter-satellite links can allow more complex satellite QKD networks.
ter. This is discussed in more detail in section IV B.
The main advantage of using an uplink is that it is
not necessary to locate a (potentially complex) quantum
light source in space, but only to place a receiver on board
the satellites [42, 43]. It also makes attacks that target
receivers significantly more difficult [44].
It is also possible to achieve a downlink by using retro-
reflectors on the satellite, which modulate signals sent
from the ground as they bounce off back to a receiver
also on the ground [45]. The challenge here is to develop
fast modulating retro-reflectors, and to develop counter-
measures that prevent an eavesdropper from sampling
the state of the retro-reflector while QKD is being car-
ried out.
Using downlinks also gives rise to the possibility of op-
tion 4 in Fig. 2. A source of entangled photon pairs
can be located in the satellite, and all of the photon
pairs transmitted to ground—one photon in each pair
to one ground station, and the other in each pair to a
second ground station [19, 40]. This configuration al-
lows the realization of entanglement-based QKD directly
between the ground stations, without using the satellite
as a trusted node. The Chinese Micius satellite [46] has
successfully demonstrated entanglement swapping over
1200 km to two mountain-top observatories using this,
option 4, configuration. The 64 dB to 70 dB losses they
experience are comparable with those predicted in stud-
ies [47] but make practicable QKD challenging.
In the Micius demonstration a Bell inequality test be-
tween the two ground stations proves that the photons
are entangled. Since the photons are entangled, no other
party, including the satellite, has made a measurement
on them previously. This scenario only works when both
ground stations simultaneously have line-of-sight to the
satellite. Also at wider separations slant angles would
be low, so the optical link would have to traverse longer
distances, and thus more atmosphere, than a direct, over-
head pass. The losses are so high because the losses
in both arms are effectively combined since only photon
pairs that arrive at both stations can be used.
It has also been suggested that sources of entangled
photons in space could be employed as quantum repeater
stations, enabling entanglement swapping among more
distant locations on the ground [48]. As more quantum
ground stations come online more complex network archi-
tectures will become necessary [49] and will likely include
inter-satellite quantum links [50].
The characteristics of the communication links are
themselves dependent on the specific orbit of the satel-
lite [39]. Orbital altitudes are classified into three main
categories: Low Earth orbit (LEO), Medium Earth or-
bit (MEO), and Geostationary orbit (GEO) [51]. LEO
are situated between 160 to 3000 km in altitude (usu-
ally below 900 km), GEO has an altitude of precisely
35 786 km, while MEO correspond to all orbits between
LEO and GEO. For satellite QKD applications, LEO and
GEO are the two most suitable options. Although most
current programmes opt for LEO, future projects might
seek higher altitudes [49]. A satellite in LEO benefits
from proximity to the surface which significantly reduces
losses due to beam diffraction. The drawbacks in this
case are the high speed of the satellite relative to surface
of the Earth, which makes it challenging to achieve ac-
curate pointing during signal transmission, as well as the
fact that QKD can only be performed during the limited
flyover time of the satellite. On the other hand, the sit-
uation is essentially reversed in GEO; the satellite is at
rest relative to the ground, but it is located at a much
higher altitude, where QKD can in principle be run con-
tinuously, but at the expense of much higher losses.
Polar LEO will pass ground stations at the poles with
every orbit and equatorial LEO will pass ground stations
on the equator with every orbit, but other orbital inclina-
tions and ground station locations will have less regular
passes. The time of day of the flyovers will also vary un-
less the orbit is specially chosen to be sun synchronous.
The Micius satellite for example is in a 500 km sun syn-
chronous orbit so that it passes over the Xinglong ground
station for 5 minutes every night at around 12:50am local
time [41]. In comparison, a night-time-operating QKD
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satellite in the ISS (International Space Station) orbit –
which is partway between a polar and an equatorial or-
bit – would have about 150 usable night time passes over
a ground station at 40◦ latitude during a period of 12
months [52].
It should be noted that GEO orbits place the satellites
above the equator, so the satellite is closer to the horizon
for locations that approach the poles, disappearing below
the horizon at 81◦ latitude. In these cases, the optical
link must traverse a much larger amount of atmosphere
and will suffer additional loss. Satellite QKD for such lo-
cations might adopt less conventional orbit choices, such
as the Molniya highly elliptical orbits (HEO) [53] used to
provide polar regions with near-constant satellite cover-
age.
IV. TECHNICAL REALIZATION
Satellite QKD proposals typically employ polarization
encoding of individual photons, as this is well suited
to free-space communication. When using polariza-
tion encoding, the photons are obtained either from a
weak coherent pulse (WCP) source or from polarization-
entangled photon-pair sources. A minority of propos-
als investigate options for time-bin entanglement [54], or
QKD with orbital angular momenta of photons [55], but
these approaches are less mature. Their appeal lies in the
possibility of generating hyper-entangled states, where
multiple quantum states can be encoded into a single
photon.
Development towards the realization of polarization
encoded, satellite-based QKD can be traced to the early
demonstrations of free-space QKD using both weak co-
herent pulses and entangled photons. By 1998, Buttler
et al. had produced 1 km outdoor QKD links for night-
time operations [56], later extending that to 1.6 km with
daytime operations [57]. Other research groups went on
to achieve longer links, from 10 km [58] to 23.4 km [59]
to 144 km [16]. In 2016 the Micius satellite began per-
forming QKD between space and ground which, at its
maximum, is spanning a distance of 1200 km [41].
Space-based instruments represent serious design chal-
lenges, as size, weight and power are limited on space-
craft. Robustness is also important as the satellite launch
process is not gentle, yet precise optical alignments must
be maintained. Finally, the space environment requires
special considerations to allow for the satellite to survive
the vacuum, microgravity, radiation and thermal envi-
ronments it experiences in orbit [60].
In the subsections below we review some technical de-
tails and challenges that have been published in this field,
from the photon sources, to the optical links, to the quan-
tum receivers and communications overheads.
A. Photon sources
Significant progress has been made in the design of
weak coherent pulse sources used to generate photons in
most BB84 schemes [61, 62] (e.g. Fig. 3a). One of the
bottlenecks towards high-speed BB84 schemes was the
need for active polarization manipulation, which is both
power-intensive and slow. This limitation was overcome
in a design which used four laser diodes inside a single
transmitter [61]. By utilizing the high degree of polariza-
tion intrinsic to the diodes, this enabled each diode to be
identified with a unique polarization state. A drawback
of this approach is that the spectra of the diodes are not
always identical and provide a possible side-channel for
eavesdroppers [64]. This side-channel was closed in a re-
cent development where a single laser diode was coupled
to four (direct-write) waveguides, each of which was capa-
ble of a fixed amount of polarization rotation [65]. The
waveguides were then recombined to result in a single-
mode output with four possible polarization states. An
added advantage of this design is its small form-factor,
enabling it to be considered as a transmitter for both
ground or satellite segments.
The Micius satellite performs space-to-ground BB84
QKD using 850 nm photons from eight fibre-based laser
diodes – four for signal and four for decoy states – pulsed
at 100 MHz [41]. An alternative design could use vari-
able strength lasers, which might additionally be able to
function as a laser beacon (see section IV B 2) [52].
Retroreflector schemes use ground-based light sources,
which can be quite powerful – not themselves WCP –
because it is only the reflected pulses from the retrore-
flector that need be in the weak coherent state. For syn-
chronization purposes, such QKD photons could be com-
bined with the pulse train from a satellite laser ranging
system [45]. To use these setups to perform BB84 QKD
the photons leaving the source would all have the same
polarization, which would be modified by the satellite
upon reflection by a polarization-modulating retroreflec-
tor. Significant development work is likely to be neces-
sary to produce a retroreflector that could be modulated
at sufficiently high rates with sufficiently high contrast
ratios. There would also need to be various compensa-
tion devices to overcome the effects of the satellite mo-
tion, and as with many QKD systems, irradiance mea-
surements would need to be taken to look out for eaves-
droppers [36], i.e. to check that no eavesdropper laser was
also interrogating the retroreflector [66].
The QKD schemes that utilize entanglement almost all
rely on polarization entangled photon-pair sources based
on bulk-crystal, collinear, spontaneous parametric down-
conversion (SPDC), either periodically-poled potassium
titanyl phospate (PPKTP) or single-domain crystals such
as beta barium oxide (BBO) [46, 67–71].
A PPKTP-based design [70] was identified by the Eu-
ropean Space Agency for the original Space-QUEST pro-
posal [40] and for the double-downlink demonstrations
the Micius satellite uses a PPKTP source in a Sagnac in-
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FIG. 3. Examples of optical layouts for sources used in po-
larization encoded DV-QKD designed for satellite QKD. (a)
– a weak coherent pulse source for BB84 QKD (adapted from
[63]). (b) – a polarization-entangled photon-pair source using
PPKTP in a Sagnac loop arrangement (adapted from [46])
(c) – a polarization-entangled photon-pair source based on
BBO with Bell’s violation analysers (adapted from [67]), for
BBM92 QKD these analysers would most likely be replaced
with quad detector receivers as per (a).
terferometer arrangement, shown if Fig. 3 B [46]. Sagnac-
loop arrangements are auto-compensating allowing the
spectral characteristics of the source to be tuned with-
out requiring specifically modified birefringent walk-off
compensation crystals [72]. The Micius source generates
entangled photon pairs of ∼810 nm at a rate of ∼5.9 mil-
lion per second under a pump power of ∼30 mW. It
uses a thick titanium alloy baseplate and Invar mounts
for thermal and mechanical stability. It also has piezo
adjustable steering mirrors and an on-satellite BB84 re-
ceiver to allow it to be realigned in orbit [46].
Although BBO has a smaller χ(2) non-linearity com-
pared to PPKTP, its optical properties are much more
temperature tolerant. Furthermore, single-domain crys-
tals are available in very large apertures (typically several
millimetres), simplifying optical alignment, whereas peri-
odically poled materials are restricted to a small aperture
not exceeding 2 mm due to the difficulty in maintaining
regular poling across the crystal. Altogether, this makes
BBO and other similar single-domain crystals very at-
tractive raw material for the design of sources of entan-
gled photon pairs [73–75].
Polarization-correlated, photon-pair sources based on
BBO have been demonstrated in orbit on board the 2U
Galassia nanosatellite [18]. The source design is also ex-
tremely robust, having survived a dramatic launch ve-
hicle explosion [76]. The correlated source design is
being extended and enhanced to generate polarization-
entangled photon pairs [67, 71] for demonstration in fu-
ture nanosatellite missions [77] (see Fig. 3c).
The pump light from laser diodes for SPDC sources
can easily reach 40 mW when stabilized with external
cavities [78] and even exceed 100 mW when operated in
free-running mode. For QKD links using SPDC sources
the limiting factor is therefore not the photon generation,
but the ability of the single photon detectors to distin-
guish between the photons arriving with small timing
separations, as will be discussed in section IV C 1.
B. Optical links
The optical links use telescope-like optics at the pho-
ton source transmitter and at the receiver to beam the
photons between satellite and ground station in the same
manner as classical laser communications links. The links
are where the largest losses occur and thus have the
biggest impact on the quantum bit error rate (QBER),
which is the relevant signal-to-noise ratio in QKD and
which will be discussed in more detail in section IV C 2.
Simulated losses for example optical link scenarios are
shown in Table I which is adapted from Ref. [38] and
does not include detector losses.
In the downlink configuration, optical loss is essentially
dominated by diffraction, i.e. broadening of the beam,
which increases as the square of the link length. In the
uplink configuration, atmospheric turbulence, which is
most significant in the 20 km immediately above the sur-
face of the Earth, has a much larger effect, adding over
20 dB of loss for the example in Table I. This extra loss in
uplink may mitigate many of the perceived conveniences
gained from locating the quantum light source on the
ground. However, since this atmospheric turbulence is
fluctuating, the use of signal-to-noise ratio filters to dis-
6
TABLE I. Simulated link attenuation for 800 nm photons in
various link scenarios [38]
1m ground
receiver
30 cm LEO
receiver
30 cm GEO
receiver
1m ground
transmitter
27.4 dB
(500 km)
64.5 dB
(36,000 km)
30 cm LEO
transmitter
6.4 dB
(500 km)
28.5 dB
(2000 km)
52.9 dB
(35,000 km)
30 cm GEO
transmitter
43.6 dB
(36,000 km)
52.9 dB
(35,000 km)
53.9 dB
(40,000 km)
card data when noise levels are highest, can lead to lower
QBER and thus longer private keys [79, 80]. This is
because if the full data set were used, the QBER value
would be higher and many more of the photons would be
required for error correction and privacy amplification.
Similar schemes have also been discussed for CV-QKD
[81].
The following subsections discuss the origins of these
optical losses and the fundamental engineering challenges
to address when establishing optical links. These are
principally: coping with the losses/depolarizing effects in
the optical path, and ensuring the telescopes are pointing
precisely at each other.
1. Optics considerations
Diffraction losses are dependent on the telescope de-
sign and beam spatial mode and increase as the inverse
square of the wavelength (λ). Conversely, atmospheric
absorption losses tend to decrease with increasing wave-
length, though there are also large spectral bands in
which the atmosphere is almost entirely opaque. Losses
due to atmospheric turbulence also decrease slightly as
wavelengths increase. Favourable spectral bands, where
relevant laser systems also exist, can be seen in Fig. 4 and
include 665 nm to 685 nm, 775 nm to 785 nm, 1000 nm to
1070 nm and 1540 nm to 1680 nm [47].
Of the methods discussed in section III, a single
downlink is the most practical, and in these cases
entanglement-based QKD has been shown to be more
tolerant to loss than prepare-and-measure schemes due
to the intrinsic timing correlation between photon-pairs
generated in the SPDC process [82].
A trade-off when designing the telescope optics is the
choice of either transmissive or reflective telescopes. Re-
flective mirrors can be larger, although for polarization-
based QKD care must be taken to prevent large depo-
larization effects. Secondary mirrors of reflector tele-
scopes are often placed within the path of the beam
so that it blocks part of the primary mirror and affects
the diffraction spreading, although the loss is less than
1 dB for a secondary mirror diameter up to 25% the ra-
tio of the primary mirror diameter (D) [47]. Beam di-
vergence scales with λ/D, so larger apertures produce
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FIG. 4. Simulated transmittance of the atmosphere (adapted
from [47]). Top – at zenith in a typical rural location with
overlaid coloured lines showing the wavelengths of commer-
cially available laser systems. Bottom – as a function of the
pointing angle above the horizon for the various lasers.
smaller beam divergences with lower free-space losses, al-
though because of atmospheric turbulence, increasing the
diameter of ground-based transmitters above a few tens
of centimetres makes little improvement on the losses.
Indicative examples of ground-based transmitting tele-
scopes in studies start from 25 cm in diameter, LEO-
based transmitting telescopes from 9 cm and GEO-based
from 13.5 cm [47, 52, 81]. The Micius quantum satellite
uses transmitters of 18 and 30 cm [46].
The success of the Micius satellite has confirmed the
scientific consensus [83, 84] that the atmosphere does not
degrade polarization states. Additional studies have also
suggested this to be true for the time-bin degree of free-
dom [54].
The Micius satellite collects its entangled photons into
single mode fibres. These are sensitive to vibrations
and after launch introduced random polarization rota-
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tions which needed to be compensated using motorized
waveplates during in-orbit commissioning and every few
weeks thereafter. The satellite’s transmitter also has ad-
ditional polarization correcting elements to compensate
for the spacecraft attitude drift. Other polarization cor-
rections are usually performed at the receiver and are
discussed in the receiver section (IV B 3) below. Time-
bin entanglement-based QKD would require additional
Doppler corrections [85].
2. Pointing, acquisition and tracking (PAT)
Establishing the optical link is usually performed in
several stages. Satellite orbit determination data such
as radar tracking, GPS and star tracker measurements
can be exchanged between satellite and ground via radio
frequency (RF) links to provide a coarse level of mechan-
ical pointing towards each other. Laser beacons on the
ground and on the satellite can then be used as a target
to enable a finer level of mechanical pointing. The finest
level of pointing can then be achieved through optical
beam-steering systems, which are essentially correcting
for atmospheric turbulence.
Full deformable mirror adaptive optics systems could
be implemented, but they are typically not designed to
preserve polarization, and since the beam is small, higher
order wavefront perturbations would not make a large
impact [52]. For larger spacecraft, coarse level pointing
is usually achieved by mounting the telescopes on two-
axis gimbal or turntable stages, whereas for nanosatellites
coarse control is usually achieved by reorienting the en-
tire satellite. Such stages are used together with piezo
fast steering mirrors on the Micius satellite to achieve a
final pointing of around 0.6 µrad in space [46]. CQuCom
(CubeSat Quantum Communications Mission) proposes
a 3µrad pointing capability [52], which would push the
boundaries of current CubeSat capabilities.
Relative to the incoming laser beacons, outgoing op-
tical signals must be pointed at an angle to compensate
for the time delay and chromatic dispersion. For typi-
cal ground-to-LEO QKD uplink proposals, atmospheric
turbulence means the transmitter pointing accuracy has
less of a consequence than for LEO-to-ground downlinks.
A 2 µrad rms error in the pointing of a 20 cm downlink
transmitter would introduce 4 dB of loss compared to
less than 1 dB for a 20 cm uplink transmitter [47]. Jit-
ter and imperfections in the tracking systems should be
minimized so their contributions to beam broadening are
much less than those caused by diffraction and atmo-
spheric turbulence. The receiver system need only point
to an accuracy within its field of view, e.g. 50 µrad [47].
3. Optical receivers
Optically, the receiver telescope can be identical to the
transmitter telescope, discussed in section IV B 1. For
uplink configurations, the final key rate is strongly driven
by the diameter of the space-based receiver telescope [47],
but flying large telescopes in space is complex and costly.
For uplink QKD experiments to the International Space
Station (ISS), a 14.3 cm camera lens mounted on an ESA
NightPod tracking stage has been proposed as a QKD re-
ceiver [86]. The Canadian NanoQEY uplink nanosatellite
proposal uses a similar-sized 15 cm receiver while their
larger (microsatellite) uplink proposal, QEYSSAT, opts
for a 40 cm one. The QEYSAT receiver would be sim-
ilar to the quad detector receiver shown in Fig. 3a, so
it can potentially be made capable of performing both
BB84 and BBM92 protocols, to allow for a variety of
QKD sources to be demonstrated with it [42].
Ground-based receivers can be made larger more eas-
ily than their space-based counterparts and have a large
impact on key rates for downlink configurations [47].
In retroreflector experiments, the 1.5 m Matera Laser
Ranging Observatory (MLRO) was used to receive the
qubits reflected from satellites from 1000 km to 7000 km
[45, 54]. MLRO was also baselined as the receiver for the
CQuCom mission [52], while the Micius satellite has so
far been using ground-based receivers of 1 m, 1.2 m and
1.8 m [41, 46]. For commercial usage though, smaller di-
ameters are considered more attractive (e.g. 25 cm to
50 cm), in part because they can be made more mo-
bile, except for GEO communications where receivers can
have fixed pointing and thus are easier to make larger
(e.g. 2 m) [81]. While free space QKD demonstrations
are sometimes performed at high altitude sites to reduce
atmospheric turbulence, these locations are unlikely to
be attractive for useful QKD networks. For commercial
usage though, smaller diameters are considered more at-
tractive (e.g. 25 cm to 50 cm), in part because they can
be made more mobile, except for GEO communications
where receivers can have fixed pointing and thus are eas-
ier to make larger (e.g. 2 m) [81]. While free space QKD
demonstrations are sometimes performed at high altitude
sites to reduce atmospheric turbulence, these locations
are unlikely to be attractive for useful QKD networks.
For polarization-based QKD schemes, the receiver tele-
scope is typically coupled to an analyser like that in
Fig. 3a or, in the case of the Micius entanglement dis-
tribution demonstration, a Pockels cell connected to a
random number generator [46]. For the analysers to be
effective, systems must be in place to allow dynamic po-
larization variations – most particularly the relative roll
orientation of the satellite and ground station – to be un-
derstood and compensated, so that the reference frame
of the polarization bases is preserved. This is a com-
plex task for non-GEO orbits as the satellites are moving
across the sky throughout the operation, but it can be
achieved without the requirement for a feedback loop be-
tween space and ground [87–90]. In all tests, atmospheric
depolarization has been found to be minimal.
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C. Detection and key generation
The optical signal arriving at the receiving detectors
is composed of both QKD photons and stray light. The
detector output is also mixed with technical noise (e.g.
‘dark-counts’ from GM-APDs) and is considered as a raw
key that must be processed to produce a private encryp-
tion key (see Fig. 5).
1. Detectors
In DV-QKD schemes, the individual photons are reg-
istered by photo multiplier tubes (PMTs) or increasingly
by GM-APDs – also known as single-photon avalanche
diodes (SPADs) – which are advantageous due to their
smaller power requirement and physical footprint.
As has been mentioned in section IV A, the detector
time resolution capability is typically the system per-
formance bottleneck rather than the source brightness.
Silicon-based GM-APDs have a typical timing jitter of
0.5 ns; a reduced timing jitter can be achieved by sac-
rificing the avalanche volume of the photodiode, which
means that the detection efficiency is also reduced.
Detectors also have a recovery time (dead time) be-
tween detections, for APDs this can be e.g. 26 ns [92].
CMOS arrays of GM-APDs offer the potential to reduce
this to several tens of picoseconds [52].
Space-based GM-APDs must be appropriately shielded
from radiation damage if several years of operation are re-
quired. The detection efficiency of GM-APDs is typically
on the order of 50% for silicon-based devices, which can
detect visible or near-infrared light. GM-APDs for IR
telecom wavelengths also exist, although they are much
noisier and have a lower detection efficiency – around
20% – due to the different materials needed to detect
long-wavelength photons.
The GM-APDs have noise from dark-counts which
have an exponential dependence on temperature as
demonstrated in Fig. 6 (left), and which can be a signif-
icant contributor to QBER in the satellite environment.
Fig. 6 (right) shows that a simulated QKD link can tol-
erate an additional 0.5 dB of loss for every degree drop
in temperature, making it highly attractive to provide
cooling to the detectors.
In addition to PMTs and GM-APDs, ground-based re-
ceivers equipped with cryostats do have the option of op-
erating state-of-the-art single-photon detectors which use
superconducting technologies and can have detection ef-
ficiencies over 90%. These detectors can have extremely
low technical noise, but must be appropriately shielded
from thermal blackbody emission. While superconduct-
ing detectors need to be cooled to 4 K or less, for optimal
performance GM-APDs need only to be cooled to about
250 K. Unless the ultra-low temperature requirements
are overcome, superconducting detectors are unlikely to
be an attractive option for use in space [93].
Thermal management of any space-based device can
be challenging. In-orbit temperatures can vary by tens
of degrees, electrical power is limited, and, for the most
part, heat can only be lost radiatively. One approach for
the APDs may be to cool them by connecting them pas-
sively to radiators on the satellite, and while excursions
in temperature may occur, stable operation can still be
achieved by monitoring the pulse height of the detector
output to actively control the GM-APD bias voltage [94].
Technical noise in the detectors steadily increases as ion-
izing space radiation damages the silicon with extended
time in orbit [60]. Efforts are underway to investigate ef-
fective shielding techniques, as well as in-orbit annealing
methods to attempt to reverse this effect [95–97].
2. Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)
QBER is the percentage of the sifted raw keys that is
erroneous, i.e. that does not match between Alice and
Bob. As the rate of the true signal falls, the accidental
coincidences from stray light and other technical noise in
the detection and measurement apparatus make a larger
contribution to the raw keys and the QBER rises. Once
QBER exceeds 11%, the QKD protocols based on BB84
– which are the ones considered by the vast majority of
satellite projects – will not be able to generate any private
key.
For DV-QKD protocols, noise appears as accidental
correlations between the detectors of Alice and Bob.
Accidental correlations are well-approximated by the
expression: S1 × S2 × τ , where S1 and S2 are the
rate of events at the individual detectors, and τ is the
coincidence-time window. In systems where either detec-
tor can fire first, an additional factor of 2 is needed [98].
This expression only works when the detectors are in the
linear regime. In scenarios where the detectors are satu-
rated, e.g. by stray light, the recovery behaviour of the
detectors must be taken into account [99].
The effect of link loss on QBER for a model BBM92
system is shown in Fig. 6 (right) where the QBER is
plotted against link loss for a range of GM-APD tempera-
tures, with the corresponding dark counts shown in Fig. 6
(left). In this simulated system, the intrinsic QBER is
assumed to be 1.5% at full transmission, the source pro-
duces photon pairs at 1 Mcps and the coincidence window
is 2 ns.
Although it is not specifically included in the simula-
tion in Fig. 6, another significant noise source is stray
light: background photons being detected. In general,
stray light can be minimized in optical systems with ex-
tensive baffling and optical blacking, however even af-
ter extensive filtering [58, 100], DV-QKD is likely to be
a night-time activity for the near future [101, 102]. A
possible, but challenging, solution to this is to perform
DV-QKD at other wavelengths with alternative detectors
[49], or – if suitable light sources can be found – at the
wavelengths of the Fraunhofer lines, the narrow absorp-
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FIG. 5. Noise contributions to entanglement-based QKD between Alice (transmitter) and Bob (receiver) in a scenario such
as Fig. 1 frame (a). Effects determining the fidelity of the quantum states (visibility) are shown in green. Sources of unwanted
photons are shown in purple with dotted connector lines. A WCP BB84 configuration would look similar, except Alice would
have a random number generator selecting the polarization bases for her photon source and would not have a detector.
FIG. 6. Impact of noise and losses on an example BBM92 system. Left – dark counts measured in a typical SAP500
GM-APD as a function of temperature. Blue dots are measurements, red line is fitted exponential, ae(x−273.15)b + c where
a = 1790, b = 0.08, c = −81. Right – QBER as a function of optical losses (e.g. diffraction, atmosphere, etc.) and technical
noise in the SAP500 detector at different temperatures. Secure QKD is only possible when QBER is below 11% (dotted line).
tion lines in the output spectra of the Sun [103]. In this
respect, CV-QKD has the advantage because the opti-
cal systems used have a sufficiently small spectral band-
width that allows much of the background to be filtered,
enabling daytime operations [104].
3. Establishing keys
For QKD to be carried out, a number of communica-
tion tasks need to be performed between the key sharing
parties, such as basis reconciliation, clock synchroniza-
tion and time tagging of photons, the latter being the
most significant in data bandwidth.
For QKD based on SPDC sources the intrinsic tim-
ing correlation of entangled photon pairs [105] is in
the femtosecond regime [106], and can be exploited
to perform asynchronous pair detection over long-range
[107]. Prepare-and-measure schemes require alternative
approaches [108, 109]; the Micius satellite achieves this
through 10 kHz pulses in its 532 nm, downward-pointing
tracking beacon [41]. Laser ranging to passive retroreflec-
tors on the satellite can also be used to provide centimetre
level distance knowledge [52].
For continuous key production in the simulated
BBM92 system used for Fig. 6, with a detector tem-
perature of 288.15 K, the classical communications link
requires a baseline bit rate of a few Mbps which would
increase to a few tens of Mbps as the QBER decreases
allowing for a few 100s kbps of private key to be estab-
lished, as shown in Fig. 7.
For the specific example of the losses in the LEO-to-
ground configuration in Table I this would correspond
to about 55 kbps of private key requiring about 7.5 Mbps
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FIG. 7. Private key rate achievable as a function of optical
losses, and the corresponding classical communication over-
head that would be required for continuous steady state key
production, for the simulated BBM92 link in the previous fig-
ure (288.15 K). The highest QBER with which QKD can be
performed securely here is 0.11 (horizontal blue line).
classical bit rate for steady state operations. For space-
based QKD this authenticated classical link could be es-
tablished over radio links, or since an optical link is al-
ready established it could be implemented using classical
laser communications. The Micius satellite opts for radio
with 1 Mbps uplink and 4 Mbps downlink [41].
However, for QKD there is no requirement that the
classical communications happen at the same time as the
quantum communications, i.e. for non-steady state key
production, the classical communications could be stored
and transmitted at a later time and the time stamps
synchronized, bases matched and keys generated in post
processing. For example, after passing over an optical
ground station and transmitting or receiving qubits, a
LEO satellite could then perform the classical comms at
a slower rate, e.g. via a GEO communications relay dur-
ing the remainder of the orbit.
The proposed NanoQEY uplink QKD nanosatellite is
projected to create 10 kbit of secure key per month with
its 15 cm receiver, paired with a 50 cm telescope on the
ground [110]. The microsatellite QEYSSAT uplink pro-
posal however, suggests that a 40 cm receiver can achieve
∼100 kbit of secure key per pass [42]. In contrast, the Mi-
cius downlink satellite, with a 30 cm transmitter in space
and a 1 m receiver on ground, is achieving >300 kbit of
secure key per pass. For future QKD service satellites
it has been estimated that with a 13.5 cm transmitter at
LEO, the monetary costs of QKD for 50 cm and 25 cm
receivers could be e 77 per Mbit and e 312 per Mbit re-
spectively while a service from GEO to a 2 m receiver
would be e 615 per Mbit [81].
To operate as a trusted node within a QKD network
additional elements such as key management, and control
and accounting subsystems are required [81]. As with all
practical implementations of QKD, special considerations
must be paid to the side-channel attacks that might be
possible with real-world systems [111].
V. CONCLUSIONS
Satellite QKD has overcome the range limit of ground-
based links and, is being used to enable global cover-
age [41]. The technical challenges to achieving a global
network remain daunting, but progress is being made in
overcoming them.
Table II shows a summary of notable satellite QKD
initiatives that have been reported in recent years.
The top eleven rows show completed or ongoing experi-
ments and missions. Besides photon sources and tracking
systems [18, 65, 67], much important work has been made
to confirm that quantum states encoded with polariza-
tion [45, 89] and time-bin [54] experience negligible de-
coherence in space-ground optical links. These are show-
ing that the standard QKD protocols, already proven in
ground tests, also work from space, possibly even from
geostationary orbits [104]. The most notable experiment
thus far is QUESS (the Micius satellite) by the Chinese
Academy of Sciences [19].
Work in developing light sources for DV-QKD is ongo-
ing at various groups. For protocols relying on weak co-
herent pulses, there are now very compact designs using
laser diodes and waveguide-based polarization rotators
[65]. Space capable polarization-entangled photon-pair
sources to enable BBM92 or E91 protocols are also at
various stages of development [67, 72].
The performance of single photon detectors is an im-
portant consideration for DV-QKD. Currently, the limi-
tation on QKD rates (in space or on the ground) is not
given by the brightness of the photon sources, but by the
detection efficiency and timing jitter of the single pho-
ton detectors. At the moment the only fast detectors
with near-unit detection efficiency are based on super-
conducting technology and have requirements that make
them costly to operate on satellites. This is motivating
research into GM-APDs to understand how to operate
them more efficiently, and to prolong their lifetime in a
space environment [94, 97].
Table II also lists the sizes of the satellites used. In
recent years research on satellite QKD has become more
attractive with the emergence of nanosatellite platforms,
particularly the CubeSat. The standardized satellite
buses provided by CubeSats allow for the rapid devel-
opment of cost-effective space missions. In the first in-
stance, these missions aim to be technological pathfind-
ers aimed at raising the technology readiness level of
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TABLE II. A summary of satellite QKD enabling initiatives
Initiative Goal Vehicle Status/Results
QUESS [19] LEO-to-ground trusted-node satellite
QKD, uplink quantum teleportation
and double-downlink entanglement
distribution.
Micius 631 kg
satellite.
Entanglement distribution of 1203 km
[46], teleportation up to 1400 km [43]
and BB84 QKD up to 1200 km with
QBER ∼ 1% & sifted key 14 kbps [41].
Toyoshima et
al. [112]
LEO-to-ground polarization
measurement
OICETS 570 kg
satellite.
Polarization preserved within system
rms error of 28 mrad.
Takenaka et al.
[90, 91]
LEO-to ground polarization and quan-
tum limited measurements from a small
optical transponder (SOTA).
SOCRATES 48 kg
microsatellite.
Effectively no depolarization was ob-
served (100% Degree-of-polarization)
and QBER of < 5%
Gu¨nthner et al.
[104]
GEO-to-ground test of quantum state
used in coherent communication.
Alphasat I-XL
6649 kg satellite.
Quantum-limited states arrive on
the ground after transmission from
satellite.
Vallone et al.
[45]
Test of polarization state for weak coher-
ent pulses using retro-reflectors on LEO
satellites.
Jason-2 510 kg,
Larets 21 kg and
Starlette/Stella
48 kg satellites.
Average QBER of 6.5% achieved.
Yin et al. [113] Test of polarization state for weak co-
herent pulses using retro-reflectors in a
LEO satellite.
CHAMP 500 kg
satellite.
Signal to noise ratio of 16:1 observed for
polarization measurements.
Dequal et al.
[114]
Test of weak coherent pulse transmission
from retro-reflectors on a MEO satellite.
LAGEOS-2 411 kg
satellite.
Peak signal-to-noise ratio of 1.5 with 3
counts per second.
Tang et al. [18] In-orbit observation of polarization cor-
relations from a photon-pair source on a
nano-satellite.
Galassia 2 kg 2U
CubeSat.
97% contrast in polarization correla-
tion measurements. Pathfinder for
SpooQySats (below).
Nauerth et al.
[115]
QKD between the ground and a aircraft
moving at similar angular velocities to a
LEO satellite.
Dornier 228 utility
aircraft.
Sifted key rate of 145 bps, QBER of
4.8% from range of 20 km at angular
speed of 4 mrad per second.
Bourgoin et al.
[17]
QKD with a moving receiver similar to
the angular speed of satellite at 600 km
altitude.
Pick-up truck. Key rate of 40 bps with QBER of 6.5%
to 8% with receiver at a range of 650 m
moving at angular speed of 13 mrad per
second.
Wang et al.
[116]
Verification of pointing, acquisition and
tracking.
Hot-air balloon. Key rate of 48 bps and QBER of ∼ 4%
over a range of 96 km.
SpooQySats
[117]
Demonstrate polarization-entangled
photon-pair sources in space
3U CubeSats Funded mission. Launches planned
from 2018.
QEYSSat [42] Trusted-node receiver for uplink QKD. Microsatellite Funded mission.
CAPSat [95] Laser annealing of radiation-damaged
APDs
3U CubeSat Funded mission.
NanoBob [118] Trusted-node receiver for uplink QKD CubeSat Proposal.
SpaceQUEST
(2008) [40]
Double LEO-to-ground downlinks QKD
using polarization-entangled photon-
pairs.
International
Space Station
Proposal (since updated as a mis-
sion exclusively investigating decoher-
ence due to gravity [119])
Scheidl et al.
[86]
Entanglement-based QKD and Bell
tests, ground-to-LEO.
International
Space Station
Proposal.
NanoQEY [110] QKD and Bell tests ground-to-LEO
with a trusted-node satellite.
Based on NEMO
nanosatellite bus,
16 kg.
Proposal.
Zeitler et al.
[85]
Superdense teleportation, LEO-to-
ground
International
Space Station
Proposal.
QuCHAP-
IDQuantique
Establish QKD networks based on high
altitude platforms.
High-altitude
platform.
Proposal.
CQuCom [52] LEO-to-ground QKD downlinks 6U CubeSat Proposal.
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sub-systems. As the technology matures, we can expect
that full QKD missions with nanosatellites, such as the
NanoQEY [110] and CQuComm [52] proposals, will be
realized.
The placement of quantum optics technologies on
satellites also enables various fundamental physics exper-
iments [20], such as placing experimental bounds on the
effect of gravity on quantum systems as they traverse a
changing gravitational potential [119, 120] .
A technology related to QKD is the quantum random
number generator [121] used in the production of random
bits that are not pre-existing. This technology already
has applications in a number of cryptographic scenarios,
relevant in both ground and space environments. The
distribution of entanglement as part of a quantum in-
ternet [122, 123] is another possibility—the capability to
perform this is an important building block in a global
network of distributed quantum computers.
A quantum internet would not be a purely optical tech-
nology like QKD, but will require an interface to material
systems that can act as quantum memory or processing
units. Furthermore, in contrast to QKD, Doppler effects
cannot be neglected in any attempted satellite informa-
tion transfer because candidates for quantum storage can
only interact with light fields with very narrow linewidths
(in the kHz or MHz regime).
Another potential area for growth is the placement of
quantum sensors on satellites to aid in gravimetry or min-
eral exploration. First steps in operating quantum mat-
ter systems in space are being carried out by fundamental
physics experiments on the ISS [124, 125], on sounding
rockets [126] as well as with nanosatellites [127].
In summary, quantum satellite communications is
paving the way for the deployment of other quantum
technologies in space. The current pace of development
suggests that world-wide communications privacy can be
maintained in the era of powerful quantum computers,
and at the same time it is bringing the concept of a global
quantum internet closer to fruition.
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